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STATE OF UTAH 
MYRL WELLS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BLUE SHIELD OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 11871 
BRIFF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Action by plaintiff to recover benefits claimed under a 
medical prepayment contract issued by defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and Appellant seeks reversal of the Judg-
ment in plaintiff's favor and an order of this court direct-
ing the court below to enter judgment in favor of defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case came before the court on August 12, 1969, on 
a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant and for 
trial. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
denied (TR 23). Submitted with said motion and received 
2 
in evidence by the court was the medical prepayment con-
tract issued by defendant (Exhibit "A," TR 24). On mo-
tion of the plaintiff, plaintiff's deposition was also received 
in evidence as part of plaintiff's case (Tr 24). Portions of 
this desposition were read in evidence. 
Upon the denial of defendant's motion for summary 
judgment plaintiff made an oral motion for judgment based 
upon the pleadings and the evidence inasmuch as no further 
evidence was required for determination of the case; and 
defendant stipulated that said motion might be considered 
immediately without notice. The court granted the motion 
of the plaintiff and ordered that judgment be entered in 
favor of plaintiff for $780.00 plus costs (TR 23). 
Thereafter proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law were signed and entered by the court on or about August 
26, 1969, (TR 56-57). Thereupon defendant filed a motion 
under rules 52B, 59A and 59E to amend the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment, or in the alternative for a 
new trial (R 60). Defendant's motion to amend was heard 
on September 9, 1969. The court granted defendant's mo-
tion to amend the findings of fact but denied the motion to 
amend the conclusions of law and judgment (TR 34, 35 and 
36). An order granting defendant's motion to amend the 
findings and amended findings were submitted after Judge 
Jones' sudden and unexpected death and were signed by 
Judge Young on September 23, 1969, (R 62, 63 and 64). 
On April 16, 1968, plaintiff was injured in an accident 
at his home in Corinne, Utah, while he was attempting to 
repair a damaged fuel tank. He was using a jack on the 
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inside of this tank, when it slipped while under pressure 
and the handle 1,..- ;;ome other part of the jack struck plain-
tiff in the mouth (pl.'s depo. p. 3-4, TR 4-5). This accident 
broke plaintiff's jaw, knocked out three teeth and broke 
several other teeth, and forced his teeth into the back of his 
mouth (pl.'s depo. p. 4 and 5, TR 4). 
After the accident, plaintiff was taken by his wife to 
the office of Dr. H.J. Griffin, where he received some emer-
gency treatment and was then referred to Dr. White, an 
oral surgeon, in Tremonton, Utah, for hospitalization and 
treatment of the fractured jaw (TR 5, 6, 7). Plaintiff was 
under Dr. White's care for about seven weeks until the 
fracture healed (pl.'s depo. p. 7). After his discharge by 
Dr. White, plaintiff returned to Dr. Griffin for the dental 
repairs made necessary as a result of the accident (TR 6-7). 
Dr. Griffin performed only dental services for the plaintiff 
(TR 8). Plaintiff submitted to defendant the bill of Dr. 
White for oral surgical services performed in the treatment 
of the fracture which defendant paid (TR 7, pl.'s depo. p. 7). 
When the dental bill of Dr. Griffin was submitted to the de-
fendant, payment was denied on the ground that the con-
tract issued by the defendant to the plaintiff expressly 
excluded payment for dental services and because Dr. Grif-
fin was not a "participating or non-participating physician" 
within the terms of the prepayment medical contract held 
by the plaintiff. 
There is no dispute regarding the occurrence of the 
accident which plaintiff sustained on April 16, 1968, nor is 
there any dispute that at the time of said accident plaintiff 
was a subscriber to the contract issued by defendant to 
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plaintiff about 1965, upon which this suit was brought, or 
that said contract was in good standing and in full force 
and effect on the day of the accident (TR 9). 
Plaintiff had obtained this contract from defendant 
through the Farmers' Union of which he was a member 
(TR 9). The contract was solicited by an agent of defendant 
(TR 10). There is no evidence and plaintiff was unable to 
recall the substance of any conversation between him and 
defendant's agent that preceded the issuance of the con. 
tract or of any representations made by said agent with 
regard to the benefits offered in said contract (TR 10, pl.'s 
depo. p. 18). He did testify that there were no discussions 
about the exclusion of benefits from the contract which he 
could recall (TR 11). Not until after the accident did plain-
tiff ever read the contract and discover that Article 3B 
excluded certain benefits and services (TR 11-12). Plain-
tiff had no recollection of any representations concerning 
the contract made by defendant's agent (pl.'s depo. p. 18· 
19). After the contract was delivered to plaintiff, he never 
read it in any detail (pl.'s depo. p. 20). 
In the light of the foregoing facts, it is necessary to 
consider certain pertinent provisions of the contract be-
tween plaintiff and defendant. Defendant's Exhibit "A," 
about which there is no dispute, in the very first paragraph 
contains the following pertinent language: 
"This contract * * * entitles the subscriber and 
family dependents * * * to have, on and after the 
date membership becomes effective hereunder, services 
from the participating physician of their choice." 
(Emphasis added) 
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Article IE of tht contract defines the term "participat-
ing phy o. ci&.r.,' in th it'! language : 
"Participating physician shall mean any doctor 
licensed as a physician and surgeon to practice medicine 
in all its branches, who by virtue of his stock member-
ship in the Bureau has agreed to render the services 
provided by this contract." 
Article IIA ( 1) sets out the surgical services the mem-
ber shall be entitled to receive in this language: 
"The following services, except as limited in Arti-
cle III hereafter, shall be available to the member * * * 
when rendered by a participating physician of the 
Bureau: 
"A ( 1). Surgical services rendered by a participat-
ing physician in the treatment of diseases, illnesses or 
injury. The term surgical services shall mean * * * 
treatment of fractures and dislocations or orthopedic 
casting * * *" 
Throughout this contract the services to be provided 
are required to be furnished by "participating physician." 
In Article IV A of the contract, it is provided that under 
certain circumstances the services of a "non-participating 
physician" may be made available. In said Article IV A a 
non-participating physician is defined as a physician and 
surgeon "licensed as a physician and surgeon to practice 
medicine in all its branches.*" Finally, Article IIIB of the 
contract contains certain exclusions not covered by the con-
tract. Article IIIB (7) says specifically: 
"The services provided by this contract shall not 
include the following: 
6 
"(7). Physician's services for the extraction of 
teeth or other dental processes." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES DID 
NOT BY ITS TERMS ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO 
THE BENEFITS SUED FOR IN HIS COMPLAINT AND 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
OF THE COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 




THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES DID 
NOT BY ITS TERMS ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO 
THE BENEFITS SUED FOR IN HIS COMPLAINT AND 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE COURT'S 
FINDINGS AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
It is a well established principle in this State that the 
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lower court's findings must be supported by the evidence. 
Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 47 Utah 91, 151 P. 543. The 
appeJlant contends that the trial court's findings are not 
support€.d by the even when the evidence is viewed 
mosL favornhly for respondent. 
The defendant has never disputed the existence of a 
valid contract or that it was in force on April 16, 1968, so as 
to entitle the plaintiff to the benefits thereby provided; nor 
has the defendant ever asserted or claimed that the plain-
tiff did not sustain injuries in an accident which made 
necessary the services of a dentist as shown by the evidence 
in this record. However, defendant earnestly contends that 
the fact that plaintiff sustained such injuries in an acci-
dent on that date did not entitle him to the services of a 
dentist. It was for such services that the plaintiff instituted 
this action. Nowhere in the record in this case did plain-
tiff point out that the express provisions of the contract 
entitled him to the benefits of dental services; and it is 
only by construction, which the plaintiff contends must be 
applied to the contract, that the contention can be supported 
that the contract does provide for dental benefits. It is 
undisputed in the record that Dr. H. Jay Griffin, who ren-
dered the service, for which plaintiff brought this action, 
was a dentist and that the only service which he performed 
for plaintiff was dental service (TR 6, 7 -8) . No contention 
is made that Dr. Griffin was a participating physician 
within the definition of Article IE of the contract and the 
court specifically found that he was not (R 23). Any other 
finding by the court would have been contrary to all the 
evidence in this record. Nor is there any evidence in the 
record to support a contention, and none was claimed by 
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plaintiff, that defendant ever represented that the contract 
sued upon included dental services or that such a representa-
tion was used to induce the plaintiff to accept the contract. 
As defendant has already pointed out, the very first 
paragraph of the contract between the parties specifically 
provides that the services to be furnished to the plaintiff 
under the contract were those of a "participating physician" 
as defined in Article IE as "a doctor licensed as a physician 
and surgeon to practice medicine in all its branches (De-
fendant's Exhibit "A"). Furthermore, Article II of Ex-
hibit "A" clearly and unequivocally states that the services 
to be made available to the member holding the contract 
shall be rendered by a participating physician whether 
they be surgical or medical services as set out in paragraph 
A of said Article. Throughout Exhibit "A" it is provided 
that services to be furnished shall be those of a "participating 
physician," the court so found in its findings of fact (R 
62-63). The court further found that Article IIIB (7) of the 
contract provided "the services provided by this contract 
shall not include the following: (7) Physician services for 
the extraction of teeth or other dental services" (R 55). In 
the face of undisputed, plain, explicit and unambiguous 
provisions of the contract, the court rendered its judgment 
that plaintiff should recover for the service of Dr. Griffin, a 
dentist who was not a participating physician within the 
terms of this contract. By its conclusions and judgment, 
the court undertook to rewrite the contract between the 
parties upon the ground that it was ambiguous-the law is 
clear that the court was in error in so ruling. 
In Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians' Service, (Ore.) 243 
9 
P.2d. 1053, the plaintiff sought to compel the defendant 
to pay certain benefits for medical and surgical services 
incurred by her the result of injuries sustained by her in 
an :111t.1)11"0bile ar:,_1dent under an agreement similar to the 
one involved in this case. The agreement in Barmeier pro-
vided that defendant could not be required to pay for any 
expenses which resulted from the negligence of third parties 
unless the subscriber could show that recovery from such 
third party would be unsuccessful. The plaintiff had sued 
the third parties which caused her injuries and had compro-
mised her claim for an amount in excess of the medical and 
surgical expense which she had incurred. Plaintiff then 
sued defendant to compel it to make payment for her medi-
cal and surgical expenses. The court denied recovery hold-
ing that by the terms of the contract plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover. It was held that while the contract in 
some particulars was ambiguous as to what plaintiff was 
required to do in order to recover benefits under her con-
tract, the contract as a whole provided that if she recovered 
sufficient money to cover her medical and surgical expenses 
in a suit against the third parties causing the injury, the 
defendant could not be required to pay any of the benefits 
under the contract. The court said: 
"* * * the parties to the contract had the right to 
limit the liabilities of O.P.S. and place upon its obliga-
tions any conditions that they pleased * * * the rule is 
not otherwise although the conditions of limitation may 
be harsh or onerous * * *. Courts cannot ignore such 
conditions, for to do so would be to make a new contract 
for the parties." 
A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed because the 
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trial court refused to enforce the limitations of the con-
tract which were express provisions limiting the plaintiff's 
right of recovery. 
In Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association v. 
Milder, (Neb.) 41 N.W.2d. 780 at p. 795, the court held that a 
health and accident insurance company may limit its liabili-
ties in any reasonable manner, such as requiring that for 
sickness benefit to be payable the insured must be con-
tinually within doors and have regular visits by a physician 
in order to recover on the policy. It further held that such a 
limitation was not unreasonable and did not contravene pub-
lic policy. In Group Hospital Services v. Armstrong, (Tex.) 
240 S.W.2d. 418, the plaintiff sought to compel defendant 
to pay certain benefits provided in a contract issued by 
defendant which was a group hospital association, when one 
of the conditions of the contract was that service would 
only be paid for when provided in a hospital approved by 
the American Medical Association. It was held in that 
case that the provision of the contract limiting payment to 
hospitals registered with the A.M.A. was valid; and that, 
therefore, defendant could refuse payment for services 
rendered to the plaintiff in a hospital not registered with 
the A.M.A. The court specifically held that plaintiff got 
that which he contracted for and that the court should not 
extend the coverage beyond the terms of the contract. 
In Red v. Group Medical & Surgical Services, (Tex.) 
298 S.W.2d 623, plaintiff sued defendant, a Blue Shield 
medical service association, to compel it to pay for a lip-
reading course which plaintiff's minor son had received to 
teach him the art of lip reading after he was rendered 
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totally deaf from cerebra-spinal meningitis. The defendant 
had paid all the expenses for the treatment of the disease, 
hut refused to pay for the lip-reading course on the ground 
that it was not. •·overed by the terms of the contract as 
"expenses incurred in the treatment and care of the pa-
tient." It was held that recovery was properly denied, 
that the construction of the medical service contract claimed 
by the plaintiff would be going beyond the intent of the 
parties, and further that the contract was not ambiguous. 
In Issacson v. Wise Casualty Association (Wis.) 203 N.W. 
918, the plaintiff sought to recover for the services of a 
chiropractor which he had received in treatment for rheuma-
tism and pleurisy. Under the insurance contract which had 
been issued to plaintiff by defendant, defendant had agreed 
to pay for services rendered by a physician. The question 
in that case was whether a chiropractor was a physician 
within the meaning of the policy-it was held no. That 
court said: 
"It is clear that the parties to an insurance policy 
have a right to limit or qualify the terms of the contract 
in any manner not inconsistent with the conditions of 
the standard form or contrary to public policy." 
It was, therefore, proper for the insurance company to 
require, as a condition of the payment of sick benefits, 
that the insured should be attended by a "legally qualified 
physician and that if the insured failed to avail himself of 
such services, the company would be excused from paying 
the sick benefit." The court held that a chiropractor "was 
not a physician within the traditional concept of that term 
and plaintiff was not entitled to recover for his services 
* * * " The court further said: "* * * we think the inten-
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tion was so clear that a legally qualified physician should be 
employed in order to enable the insured to recover the sick 
benefit." 
Also in State Medical Society of Wisconsin v. Charles 
Manson, Commissioner, (Wis.) 12 N.W.2d. 231, the court 
held that a podiatrist did not come within the definition of a 
"medical or osteopathic physician licensed to practice in 
Wisconsin." 
In view of the uncontroverted fact that the contract in 
question in this case expressly provides that the only service 
to be provided to the subscriber is that of a participating 
physician, which is defined expressly to mean a doctor li-
censed as a physician and surgeon to practice medicine in all 
its branches, proper construction of the contract requires a 
holding that the service of a dentist is not covered and 
cannot be recovered by plaintiff as a benefit under the plain 
and unambiguous terms of the contract, even though made 
necessary by reason of an accident. 
It is, therefore, clear that the trial court by ruling 
that this contract was intended to include the services of 
Dr. Griffin, a dentist, was erroneous, and was contrary to 
the findings of fact and the undisputed evidence in the 
record. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS 
NOT AMBIGUOUS. 
Defendant concedes that the rule applicable in this 
13 
State, not only ih cases involving insurance contracts but 
31,, , >1 .:'.G' tr!i ci s generally, is that ambiguities are to be 
cnnstrued against the p::i.rty who wrote the contract. How-
ever, this rule is only applicable where the ambiguity creates 
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning and intent of the 
parties. This rule is exemplified in the case of Stout v. 
Wash:ngton Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 14 Utah 
2d. 414, 384 P.2d. 608. However, a corollary of this rule 
is that in interpreting a contract, the entire instrument 
must be considered, and even though one provision may 
contain an ambiguity, if other provisions of the entire in-
strument clearly resolve the ambiguity, then the rule of 
construction against the author of the instrument is not 
applicable. In Vitagraph Inc. v. American Theater Co., 77 
Utah, 71, 291 P. 303, the court said: 
"These provisions of the assignment contract lend 
some support to appellant's contention. In construing 
a contract, however, 'the interpretation must be upon 
the entire instrument and not merely on disjointed or 
particular parts of it. The whole context is to be con-
sidered in ascertaining the intention of the parties, 
even though the immediate object of inquiry is the 
meaning of an isolated clause. Every word in the 
agreement must be taken to have been used for a pur-
pose, and no word should be rejected as mere surplusage 
if the court can discover any reasonable purpose thereof 
which can be gathered from the whole instrument. 
The contract must be viewed from beginning to end and 
all of its terms must pass in review; for one clause 
may modify, limit, illuminate the other. Taking its 
words in their ordinary and usual meaning, no sub-
stantive clause must be allowed to perish by construc-
tion, unless insurmountable obstacles stand in the way 
of any other course. Seeming contradictions must be 
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harmonized if that course· is reasonably possible. Each 
of its provisions must be considered in connection with 
the others, and, if possible, effect must be given to ali. 
A construction which entirely neutralizes one provision 
should not be· adopted if the contract is susceptible of 
another which gives effect to all of its provisions." 
In Fawcett v. Security Benefit Association, 99 Utah, 
193, 104 P.2d. 214, the court construed the language of an 
insurance contract and said with respect to alleged ambiguj. 
ties the following : 
"Since such provision of the certificate is not so 
clear as to be susceptible of but one construction, we 
must determine which of the permissible interpreta.. 
tions thereof is consistent with the other provisions of 
the entire agreement. Even though a particular pro· 
vision of a contract of insurance be susceptible of more 
than one meaning, the construction of such provision 
more favorable to the assured will not be adopted if 
other provisions of the entire contract clearly resolve 
the ambiguity in favor of the contrary construction." 
Furthermore, the ambiguity, if there is one, must be 
determined from the instrument itself and resort may not 
be had for interpretation or explanation from outside 
sources. Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d. 
163, 321 P.2d 221: 
"In considering the controversy here it is well to 
keep in mind the fundamental concepts in regard to 
contracts: that their purpose is to reduce to writing 
the conditions upon which the minds of the parties have 
met and to fix their rights and duties in respect thereto. 
The intent so expressed is to be found, if possible, 
within the four corners of the instrument itself in 
-
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acco1· lance with the ordinary accepted meaning of the 
word:: :.med. Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty 
in the language so that the meaning is confused, or is 
susceptible of more than one meaning, there is no 
justification for interpretation or explanation from 
extraneous sources. It would defeat the very purpose 
of formal contracts to permit a party to invoke the use 
of words or conduct inconsistent with its terms to prove 
that the parties did not mean what they said, or to use 
such inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate 
uncertainty or ambiguity where none would otherwise 
exist. Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor 
the court has any right to ignore or modify conditions 
which are clearly expressed merely because it may 
subject one of the parties to hardship, but they must be 
enforced 'in accordance with the intention as * * * 
manifested by the language used by the parties to the 
contract!" 
Moreover, where the language used is plain, unequi-
vocal and unambiguous, the rule for resolving ambiguities 
against the author of the instrument is not applicable. In 
Moss v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 89 
Utah, 1, 56 P. 2d 1351, this court stated: 
"The language is plain, unequivocal and unam-
biguous. The rule contended for by appellant for a 
construction of an ambiguous provision most strongly 
against the insurer and in favor of the insured has no 
application here. In Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 
284 U.S. 489, 52 S. Ct. 230, 231, 76 L. Ed. 416, Mr. 
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the court, said: 'It is 
true that where the terms of a policy are of doubtful 
meaning, that construction most favorable to the in-
sured will be adopted. * * * This canon of construction 
is both reasonable and just, since the words of the policy 
are chosen by the insurance company; but it furnishes 
16 
no warrant for avoiding hard consequences by import 
ing into a contract an ambiguity which otherwise would 
not exist, or, under the guise of construction, by fore. 
ing from plain words unusual and unnatural mean. 
ings." 
Again in Bryant v. Deseret News Publishing Company, 
120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355, the same rule was announced in 
this language : 
"Plaintiff also invokes the rule of interpretation 
that doubtful, ambiguous terms in a contract should be 
interpreted against the party who has chosen the 
terms * * * We agree that these rules of construction 
should be considered in determining what is a rea. 
sonable and fair interpretation of the intention of the 
parties : However, if the language is clear and is not 
susceptible of more than one interpretation, the ordi· 
nary plain meaning of the words must be used." 
See also Oregon Short Line Railroad Company v. Idalw 
Stockyards Company, 12 Utah 2d 205, 364 P.2d 826, and 
Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation Company, 
96 Utah 403, 80 P.2d 458. 
1 In other words, there must be a real ambiguity, no 
forced or strained construction may be employed in order to 
get a different meaning in accordance with the interest of 
one of the parties. This rule was announced by this court 
in Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Com-
pany, 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264, wherein this court said: 
"In case of uncertainty or ambiguity, the language 
of the policy should be construed most strongly against 
the company because it drew and issued it, but that rule 
has no application unless there is some genuine am· 
17 
bigu]i v. or uncertainty in the language upon which 
hle minds may differ as to the meaning. That 
is not satisfied because a party may get 
a different meaning by placing a forced or strained 
comitruction upon it in accordance with his interest. 
The test to be applied is : Would the meaning be plain 
to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, 
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance 
with the usual and natural meaning of words, and in 
the light of existing circumstances, including the pur-
pose of the policy. If so, the special rule of construc-
tion is obviously unnecessary." 
See also EJJhrain Theater Company v. Hawk, supra. In 
construing the contract, the language must be given its 
plain, ordinary and obvious meaning. Bonneville Lumber 
Company v. J. G. Peppard Seed Company, 72 Utah 463, 
271 P. 226: 
"It is a cardinal rule of construction, and the first 
to be applied whenever construction becomes necessary, 
that, unless technical terms are used, the language 
must be given its plain, ordinary and obvious meaning." 
Bryant v. Deseret News Publishing Company, supra. 
It is also the rule recognized in Utah that the funda-
mental and true purpose of construing the language of a 
contract is to arrive at the true intention of the parties. 
Anderson v. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 51 Utah 78, 168 P. 
966. In Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of 
the United States, 92 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060, it was stated 
by this court that: 
"The contract of insurance should be construed 
so as to carry out the intention of both parties, not 
merely the intention of one party." 
18 
Tested by the foregoing rules, it must be clear that 
plaintiff was not entitled to require defendant, under his 
contract, to pay for the services of Dr. H. Jay Griffin. The 
language of the contract itself makes this apparent. From 
this language it is clear that there is no need to resort to 
any evidence outside the four corners of the contract in 
order to determine its meaning. As we have already pointed 
out, the· first paragraph of this Exhibit "A" defines the 
kind of medical service which the defendant is required to 
provide and which the plaintiff shall be entitled to receive. 
That language is as follows : 
"This contract * * * entitles the subscriber and 
family dependents* * *to have* * * services from the 
participating physician of their choice." 
We have already pointed out that Article IE states that a 
participating physician is a doctor licensed as a physician 
and surgeon to practice medicine in all its branches. Even 
in those instances where the contract provides that a member 
may be entitled to the services of a non-participating physi· 
cian who is a physician not holding stock membership in the 
defendant association or who has not agreed to render the 
services provided by the contract, such service must be 
rendered by a physician and surgeon licensed to practice 
medicine in all its branches (Article IVA of Exhibit "A"). 
Thus from the language of the contract itself, the intention 
of the parties can be clearly ascertained that the service to 
be provided shall not include the service of a dentist. 
In order to make doubly certain that the services of a 
dentist were not intended to be covered under this contract, 
Article IIIB (7) specifically excludes "physician's service 
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for extraction of teeth or other dental processes." The trial 
court speciL' ally found that Dr. Griffin, who performed 
Hv vicc>s ft 1 ..vhich this action was brought, was a dental 
surgeon and was Pot a physician and surgeon licensed to 
practice medicine in all its branches at and during the time 
said services were performed for and on behalf of the plain-
tiff ( R. 63) . Under such a finding it is respectfully sub-
mitted that to require defendant to pay for Dr. Griffin's 
services on plaintiff's behalf not only flies in the face of the 
plain, express and unambiguous language of the contract, 
but furthermore enlarges and rewrites the contract to in-
clude benefits not intended or contracted for by the parties. 
Plaintiff and the trial court attempted to seize upon 
isolated provision of the contract defining surgical 
benefits to which plaintiff was entitled. Plaintiff called the 
trial court's attention to the provision of Article IIA (1) part 
of which is set out in the court's findings (R 55). The full 
text of this provision, paraphrased to omit unnecessary 
verbage, is as follows : 
"* * *services except as limited in Article III here-
after shall be available to the member * * * when 
rendered by a participating physician of the Bureau." 
(Emphasis added) 
"A ( 1). * * * surgical services rendered by a par-
ticipating physician in the· treatment of diseases, ill-
nesses or injury." (Emphasis added) 
Even though it is apparent that the services of Dr. 
Griffin to the plaintiff were rendered in the treatment of an 
injury, such service was not the treatment of a fracture, 
dislocation or orthopedic casting. The court did not so find, 
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but merely recited the provision of the contract as including 
treatment of such conditions (R 55). The uncontradicted 
evidence is that plaintiff's fractured jaw was treated by 
Dr. White, an oral surgeon (TR 5, 6 and 7). The plaint:fi 
remained under Dr. White's care for seven weeks or untli 
the fracture was healed (pl.'s depo. p. 7). It was only after 
Dr. White had completed his work in the treatment of the 
fracture that Dr. Griffin performed the dental work made 
necessary by the accident. (TR 6-7). It was conceded by 
plaintiff that only dental services were performed by Dr. 
Griffin (TR 8). 
The trial court seemed to labor under the misconcep. 
tion that because the dental services became necessary by 
reason of an accident and not because of the natural procesi 
of decay that plaintiff should recover for such dental 
services. As Appellant construes the trial court's reason· 
ing, recovery for the plaintiff was ordered because all oi 
plaintiff's injuries were incurred at the same time, in the 
same accident and because plaintiff was entitled to 
for treatment of the jaw fracture, he should likewise be able 
to require defendant to pay for the dental work; and further 
that this was so notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Griffin's 
services were confined to dental work and that he wa.1 
neither a participating nor even a non-participating physi· 
cian within the plain meaning and language of the contract: 
and notwithstanding that the contract by express ter'lll! 
excluded physician services for extraction of teeth or other 
dental processes. The court seemed to reason that becaUSI 
the plaintiff sustained injuries, it was the intention of the 
parties that if treatment thereof could only be performed 
by a dentist then such treatment should be paid for as a 
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benefit under the contract. The contention of plaintiff that 
the language of Article IIA ( 1) was rendered ambiguous by 
reaRon of lang-uage of Article IIIB (7) is totally untenable. 
ln c.mier th.at there can be no doubt as to the kind of 
service rendered by Dr. Griffin, the plaintiff was asked on 
his deposition what was done by Dr. Griffin, the plaintiff 
testified as follows : 
Q. The dental work has all been taken care of by Dr. 
Griffin, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did that work consist of replacing the teeth 
that were knocked out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In the accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And repairing teeth that were damaged in the 
accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And also bridging? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was for the repair of your teeth? 
A. Yes. (TR 14) 
Also: 




Q. So when he said "I am through with my work, i 
will release you to go back now to have the dent.a 
work done" he knew that you would be going bacl 
to Dr. Griffin to have that work done? 
A. Yes. (TR 15) 
Dr. Griffin's statement was admitted in evidence as Exhibil 
"2" to plaintiff's deposition (TR 7). Plaintiff was 
about the contents of this statement as follows : 
Q. It says over here as I read it, and you can correct me 
if necessary, a seven-tooth bridge, is that what you 
understand ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And two inlay abutments? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And two incisal inlays? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there is something about ceramic, I suppose 
that is the material out of which the bridge wai 
made? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would this include the replacement of thi 
teeth that you lost in the accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you lose seven teeth? 
A. No. 
Q. How many? 
A. Well, they had to put a bridge in there and the! 
had to grind off a bunch of my teeth. 
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Q. They had to anchor the bridge didn't they? 
A. Yes. 
<J. ALd actually you lost three teeth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they have been replaced? 
A. (witness nodded his head) 
Q. And you are wearing the partial denture that Dr. 
Griffin made for you following the accident. 
A. Uhuh! 
The fact that plaintiff was not aware that dental 
services were excluded from the contract is immaterial. We 
have already cited authorities holding that a party has a 
right to limit the coverage of a contract of this type, and 
that such a contract, as so limited, defines the services 
which are to be provided and by whom they are to be pro-
vided: Barmeier v. Oregon Physician Services, supra, Red v. 
Group Medical & Surgical Services, supra, Isaacson v. Wis-
consin Casualty Association, supra, and Group Hospital 
Services v. Armstrong, supra. 
The contract in this case was limited by its language 
to injuries treated by a participating surgeon and was not 
an agreement to pay for treatment of injuries without re-
gard to who furnished or provided such treatment. If the 
construction which plaintiff would place upon this contract 
is correct, then the plaintiff could have claimed benefits for 
treatment of injuries by any practitioner of the healing arts, 
including chiropractor, naturopath, chiropodist, occurring in 




The judgment of the court below is not supported 
either by the findings of the court or the evidence in tht 
record for two reasons : 
1. Because this contract between parties expressly 
excluded dental services from the benefits covered by the 
contract ; and 
2. Because the services for which recovery is sought 
were not furnished by a doctor licensed as a physician and 
surgeon to practice medicine in all its branches, which limita. 
tions the defendant was entitled to place upon the contract 
issued to the plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the contract between the parties is not 
ambiguous. Its plain meaning and intent can be ascer· 
tained from the four corners of the instrument. Even if 
it could be successfully contended that this contract con-
tains an ambiguity, which the defendant has expressly de· 
nied, there is no way in which the ambiguity claimed by 
plaintiff can be construed to include the services of a den-
tist or that a dentist is a participating physician within 
the terms of the contract. On the other hand, the contract 
on its face and the evidence in the record shows as a matter 
of law that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought 
and, therefore, the judgment should be reversed and judg· 
men should be ordered in favor of the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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